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cuo•vuaL,;c of his claim or not
and
use of such
or draft constitute an accord and satisfacit is immaterial that the creditor rn·.~tach
the tender in full
the law
either
condition.
!d.-Character of
the
satisfaction to apply in disposition of an
there must be a bona fide dispute between the
immaterial whether the
has a solid foundation.
Id.-Tender-Acceptance.-For the
of accord and
satisfaction to apply, the debtor must make it clear that acof what he tenders is
to the condition that
it
be in full satisfaction.
Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Findings on uonnJlCtJ.ng
Evidence.-A finding of the trial court on
evidence
will not be disturbed on appeal if there is evidence of
stantial character which reasonably
the
!d.-Questions of Law and Fact--Findings on Evidence Subject to Different Inferences.-The conclusions
trier of fact
from evidence or testimony that is
of
conflicting or opposing inferences will not be set
an
appellate tribunal.
!d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Sufficiency of Evidence to
Support Judgment.-The principles
conclusiveness on appeal of findings upon <cv,cHL"'""l"

of remittance
or
by indications
debtor's
regarded,
34 A.L.R. 1035; 75 A.L.R. 905.
134; 1 Am.Jur.
228.
McK. Dig. References:
Accord and
§ 7;
[4] Appeal and Error, 1280
Appeal and
§ 1268
Compromise and Settlement,
§6; [12]
and

cannot successfully urge a contrary inevidenced by the fact that
did
not kno1v that defendants were disputing the amounts alshipments until they remitted
correspondence and discussion
between the
culminated in an offer of
which
[9] Compromise and Settlement-Offer of Compromise.~An offer
is not an admission that anything is due (Code
it constitutes no proof of liability, and its
without
cannot affect the

[10] Accord and Satisfaction-Payment in Full Satisfaction.-In
an action to recover the alleged balance due on the sale of
the defense of accord and satisfaction is
significance that the portions of the
constituted the
point of differWf~re computed as separable items for
deduction on thr vouchr;rs accompanying defendants' remit~
testimony of a defendant indiwas integrated into tho entire con~Yhere one
involved other disputed and deducted
and where the record clearly shows that in eaeh instance
demand was in dispute and the respective
were intended and accepted in full diseharge of the
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Id.~Effect of Payment of Conceded Part of Disputed Claim.The fact that a conditionally tendered remittance is in the
eonceded sum of a disputed indebtedness will not prevent an
aecord and satisfaction from arising, whPre the tender is
applicable to the entire demand.
[12] Compromise and Settlement-Policy of Law.--'rhe law wisely
favors settlements, and where there is a real and genuine
contest between the parties, and a settlement is had without
fraud or misrepresentation, for an amount determined as a
compromise between the conflicting claims, such settlement
will be upheld, although the amount paid is materially less than
the amount claimed by the party to whom it is paid.

APPEAl; from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Luis Obispo County. Hay B. lJyon, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action to recover balance due under contracts for sale of
lnmber. .Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions.
Buck & O'Heilly and ,John I<'. Runner for Appellants.
Renetzky & Davis, Paul W. Davis and Laura 0. Coffield for
Respondent.
SPENCE, ,J.--Plaintiff sought to recover the alleged balance
due under contraets for the sale of three carloads of lumber.
Defendants pleaded an accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense. The trial eonrt made findings rejeeting said
defense and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for the
sum of $1,011.96. Prom such judgment, defendants appeal.
Defendants argue the single proposition that the findings
against the existenee of an aeeord and satisfaetion are eontrary to the undit;puted facts. An t'Xamination of the re<:ord
sm:tains dPfPndants' position.
Plaintiff, a lumber broker in Oregon, eontraeted to sell thre<~
<·arloarls of Oregon lnmber to defendant eompany, a California eorporation with offiees in San Luis Obispo. Defendants C. V. Wilson and S. G. Truitt, as viee-president and
purehasing agent, respeetively, of defendant company, negotiated the eontraets. The terms of sale speeified grade,
widths, and surfaeing of the lumber and a stated priee per
[11] Payment of undisputed amount or liability as consideration
for discharge of disputed amount or liability, note, 112 A.L.R. 1219.
See, also 1 Cal.Jur. 131; 1 Am.Jur. 251.
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1,000 board feet "F.O.B. mill," with 2 per cent discount
for cash. At the trial defendants claimed that under business custom with respect to such sales of Oregon lumber
"F.O.B. mill," the freight eharge would be at the "Portland
rate "-that
the buyer would be obligatt'd to pay the
shipping eo»t as t~omputed from Portland to the point of
destinatioH---unles;,; a different zone or rate was speeified;
that such uniform practice prevails so that the buyer may
know what his "laid down eost is" for lumber as supplied
from various small mills loeated in different parts of the
state, and any freight eost that the seller ''may have to get
the lumber into the [applicable] zone is reflected iu the mill
price''; and that on sueh basis, the buyer would regularly
charge back to the seller any "excess freight" paid to the
carrier. Plaintiff denied having any knowledge of such applicable "zone system" and the existence of such business
custom. In none of the three contracts in question was there
anything said concerning freight or the shipping rate ehargeable exeept the bare term "F.O.B. mill.'·
The first order ealled for shipment from Oregon to San
Luis Obispo. '!'hat carload arrived with a freight bill from
Spokane, \Vashingtou, to San IJt1is Obispo, as the result
of an erroneous routing. Defendant company paid the earrier's freight bilL lt then remitted $2,930.14 by check to
plaintiff, this sum representing the amount of plaintiff's
invoice, less the 2 per cent cash discount and $86.40 as "freight
overcharge' '-being the cliff(~rence between the freight actually paid to the carrier and the freight from Portland,
Oregon.
The other two orders called for shipment, respectively,
to Grover City, California, and Santa Barbara. The lumber
in each of these carloads was rough-milled at St"neca, in
eastern Oregon; one earload was then shipped to Brewster,
Oregon, for "re-manufacture," and from there transported
to Grover City, while the other carload was shipped tv
Portland for ''re-manufacture,'' and thence to Santa Barbara. On these two shipments defendant company remitted
to plaintiff by cheek the respeetive amounts of $2,594.76
and $1,772.89, having deducted in eaeh instance the 2 per
eent cash diseonnt and the freight rate chargeable from eastern
to western Oregon, respectively $500.35 and $361.49. In
addition, with respeet to the Santa Barbara ear, these further
deductions were made : $35.71 for ''scant loading,'' an extra
eharge exacted by the carrier because the car had not been

sett lem e11 t
of account stated below, and endorsement therPof
stitnte payee's receipt to the Pacific Coast I_lumbcr
of California." Plaintiff eashed eaeh
three
tam~e ehccks or ,Jrafts, and then later
eompany seeking additional
The trial eourt found that defendants
in the snm of $1,0JJ .9G
deto the San Luis
dc•luction of
for the ''
,
with
'''"n"u,,_ to the Santa Barbara car the deductions for ''scant
" improper surfacing and "random widths' . 'With
to defendants' special
of an
and satisLU'~""Ju, the eourt found that the
that the checks were actually sent to
were untrue,
that it
true
the voucher attached to each check
company "informed plaintiff that it intended the ehcck as full
of a certain disputed
'' or that the vouchers
''informed plaintiff that the said checks
intended as
full
" or that "plaintiff,
the
ment
depositing for collection of said
or in
any other manner, agreed to any settlement of the amount
due plaintiff." Defendants properly contest the propriety
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settlement thereof is
the creditor
that
must be
of his claim'' or not at
the

the condition"
on
5220: see, also, 1 CaL Jur. §
1044 75 A.IJ.R. 905, 916;
166 Cal. 25, 27
P. 989] ;
447 [213 P. 45]; Sierra&; San
Co. Y. Universa~ Electric &; Gas
197 Cal.
P.
Johnston v. Burnett, 17
497,
Rttssell
&; Peterson, 82 Cal.App.
P.
; Robertson v. Robertson, 34 Cal.
P.2d 175] ). [2] Of course, for the
accord and satisfaction to apply in disposition
there must be a "bona fide
between the
Y. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 218
P.2d
) , but ''it matters not that there was no solid foundation for the
'' as the test is whether ''the dispute
vms honest or fraudulent" (B.&; tV. Engineering Co. v. Beam,
23
171 [137 P. 624]; see 1 C.J.S. § 32(b),
1 CaLJur. § 7, p. 131; Berger v. Lane, st~pra,
450-451; Shortell v. Evans-Fergttson Corp., 98
663 [277 P. 519]; Everhardy v. Union Ft'nance
465 [1 P.2d 1024] ). [3] Also, the
make it clear that acceptance of what he tenders
to the condition that it shall be in full satisfaction.
223 Ann.Cas. 1915A, 954 Lapp-Gifford
supra, 166 Cal. 25, 27-28; Biaggz:
105, 113-114 [170 P.2d 678]
of these settled rules to the n"''""''+
that ''A
of the
evidence will not be disturbed on
of a substantial character which
the judgment." (Fewel &; Dawes, Inc.
89
P.2d
[5]
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it must be said that the conclusions of a trier of fact from

evidence or testimony that is reasonably susceptible of conflicting or opposing inferences will not be set aside by an
appellate tribunaL (Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223
143 P.2d 689] .) [6] But these principles do not relieve
an appellate court of its duty of analyzing the record for the
purpose of determining whether or not there is any evidence
of substantial character which reasonably supports the judgment as applied to the peculiar facts of the case. (See
1 C.J.S. § 49 (b), pp. 565-567.) [7] Upon such review, the
conclusion is inescapable that the record here does not justify
the finding that no accord and satisfaction was effected by the
parties in settlement of plaintiff's claim, and that the trial
com::t erred, as a matter of law, in adjudicating this issue contrary to defendants' position. (2 Cal.Jur. § 542, p. 918.)
Here the check or draft in each instance remitted to plaintiff in payment for the respective carloads of lumber had
attached a voucher with a printed statement thereon declaring,
in clrar and unequivocal terms, that the tender was made "in
full settlement of account stated below" and calling for acceptance upon that precise condition. Plaintiff clearly understood, according to his own admissions at the trial, that defendant company intended such remittances to constitute paymE>nt in full of the particular claim as plainly identified on
the voucher. Thus, plaintiff, in response to the question of
whether he had talked to defendant Wilson before cashing
the draft tendered in payment for the first shipment, stated:
''Yes, I think I did; and then I felt, if they were going to be
that way about it, the best thing for me to do was to cash
the draft so they couldn't stop payment on the draft. This
was not a check, it was a draft. I knew that, with a dispute
of that type, that there would be a question as to my accepting
that as final payment, but I figured that a bird in the hand
was better than nothing.'' Plaintiff further testified that ''at
the time rhe] cashed [the J checks, [he] knew there was a
dispute as to the amounts"; that he checked "the deductions"
that were taken, knew the "freight" amounts to be "so much"
and had ''notice'' of the other items as shown ''from the attached statement [s].'' From this testimony it plainly appears
that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties, not only
as to the assessable freight charges, but also as to the other
matters listed by defendant company as deductible items upon
tender of the checks or drafts in full settlement, and that plaintiff so nndf'rstood the explicit terms of the proffered settle-
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ment. ln such circumstanees, plaintiff's acceptance, endorsement, and cashing of the checks or drafts amounted in legal
effect to an agreement that the claims be thereby compromised
and settled (Russell v. Riley & Peterson, supra, 82 CaLApp.
728, 737-7:18) ; he "could not accept the benefits of the checks
cashing them, vrithout consenting to the conditions endorsed thereon" ( Robert:wn v. Robertson, snpm, 34 Cal.App.
2d 113, 118) ; and such uncommunicated mental reservations
as plaintiff may have had that he and defendants "would be
able to settle it [the dispute] one way or the other later"
could not militate against the validity of the accord and satisfaction (Cre·ighton v. Gregory, 142 CaL 34, 41 [75 P. 569]).
So pertinent is the statement in Johnston v. Burnett, supra,
17 CaLA.pp. 497, at page 501: ''He [plaintiff] was bound either
to reject the cheek, or, by aeeepting it, accede to the defendant's terms . . . . He could not accept the benefit, and reject
the condition . . . . The use of the cheek was ipso facto an
aeeeptance of the condition. 'rhe minds of the parties then
met, so as to eonstitute an accord."
[8a] Plaintiff argues that "the eonduct of both parties
after the receipt and cashing of the drafts'' indicates that
''neither of them intended that the prior acceptance by
[plaintiff] of the drafts was in full settlement of his claim [s].''
rro this point he cites these evidentiary considerations: that
until he received the respective drafts, he did not know that
defendants were disputing the amounts allegedly due on the
respeetive shipments; that after receiving the first of the three
drafts but before eashing it, he spoke to defendant Wilson
by telephone and protested the deductions taken; that after
eashing the three drafts, he went to defendant company's
Seattle office and discussed the factors in dispute; that there
then followed an exchange of correspondence between him and
defendant ·wilson as to the propriety of the deductions; and
finally, the whole subject was discussed at a meeting in Santa
Barbara between himself and defendant \Vilson, eulminating
in the latter's offer of a settlement but that he would not agree
to it. However, these matters do not strengthen plaintiff's
position. Reasonably viewed, they simply show that plaintiff
did not willingly assent to the condition of "full settlement"
accompanying the three remittances; that after cashing the
three drafts tendered for acceptance on the prescribed express
terms. he nevertheless persisted in his efforts to collect additional amounts which he claimed to be still due under the
original contraets of sale; and that defendants remained firm

of the
accounts, or from the
tiff's cashing such cheeks and drafts upon that basis in estab~
lishment of an accord and satisfaction.
supra, 17 Cal.1\pp. 497, 501.)
Plaintiff unavailingly cites cases where
cor~
respondence failed to state that the remittance was ''intended
or offered as in full of all demands"
Co. v.
Muscoy Water Co., supra, 166 Cal.
continued uncertainty as to the extent of their differences
called for further checking on the matter of an
conduct
showing that '
did not consider the
[prior] cheek a final settlement of the debt" (Work v. Associated Almond Growers, 102 Cal.App.
236
P.
);
where evidence of "constructive fraud, or at least
"
operated to impeach the '' eonelusiveness of the asserted stated
account" despite the notation of the words "full
' on
the cheek (Kinkle v. Fruit Growet·s
63 Cal.App.
2d 102, 115 [146 P.2d 8]) ; where the debtor "at the time the
check ''ms tendered . . . himself conceded that it did not represent the full amount due" and not
there a failure
an ''accord and
'' but it was A~~"'w~'
''
that there never had been an
''
Noble, 77 Cal.App.2d 209, 215
P.2d
). Under such
distinguishable circumstances, it is not open to
that
the trial court's finding· that no accord and satisfaction had
been effected by the parties was
substantial evidence. But that is not the record in this case. Here the condition imposed upon plaintiff's acceptance of the checks or

PoTTER

PACIFIC CoAsT LuMBER

601

[37 C.2d 592; 234 P.2d 16]

account''
114) there was no
the conclusiveness of the
any of destill open for
accounts
While
true that
evidence or where
infer~
drawn from uncontradicted
whether ''a
the amount due and whether the tender
was on eondition that acceptance would be in full satisfaetion
questions of fact for the trial court'' (Owens
supra, 77 Cal.App.2d 209, 215) and "unless there
evir1ence to support the finding of the jury or
of the
court in that regard,
determination of that issue
existence of an accord and satisfaetion]
.will not he disturheo on appeal" (Moore v.
92 CalApp.
2d
812 [207 P.2d 835] ; also D. E. Sanford Co. v. Cory
Brewer Co., 85 Ca1.App.2d 724, 730 [194 P.2d
1271), jm;t sueh lack of evidence prevails here. The record eonelusiYely shows from plaintiff's own testimony that he
knowingly aecepted the remittances from defendants on the
terms definitely stated on the accompanying vouchers in un~
equivocal expression of their intent as ''full settlemrnt,'' for
he "fig·ured that a bird in the hand was better than nothing."
This state of the evidence cannot be reasonably held to give
rise to conflieting inferences as to the intention of the parties
to consummate an accord and satisfaction upon the tender and
acceptance of the checks or drafts in question, but rather they
irresistibly point to the conclusion that plaintiff is estopped
to deny the effrct of his deliberate act in full settlement of the
disputed accounts between the parties. (See Creighton v.
Grcuory, snpra, 142 Cal. 34, 41-42.)
[10] ?\or is it of legal significance that the
charges
m'r<~ eompnte(1 Hs separable items for deduction and eonsti~
tnte<l H major point of diffrrence between the parties. While
the freight items were listed as definite amounts on each of
the vouehers accompanying the remittances, the total freight
a part of which was disputed) was for all practical
purposes integrated into the entire contract to which it related. To this point is defendant Wilson's undisputed testimony that defendant company, as the buyer of goods f.o.b.
point of manufacture, must have "the mill price and the
freight ratc"~~the "delivered price"-at hand so as to "know
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what
laid down cost is.'' In such circumstances it would
be unrealistic to isolate the freight items and regard such
items as severable undertakings in the consummation of the
parties' dealings. Moreover, in the case of one disputed shipment-the Santa Barbara car-there were also included, as
dedurtible items. amounts for "seant loading," improper sur~
faeing. and '' ranrlom
'' RO that it cannot reaRonably
he Raid that thr partieR eonsidrred, at the time of the tender
and aerrptanrP of thf' eheckR or
that the only matters
in eontroversy wen' the freight chargeR. Rather, as defendants maintain. thr rreord elrarly shows that in each instance
plaintiff's entire (lemand was in dispnte and the respeetive
ehreks wrre intended and a(•ceptrd in full diRc•.harge of the
entirr disputed obligation.
[11] It iR further suggested that drfrndant company, by
the rPRpectivr remittances in the rednced sums, paid only
the conceded ammmt of indebtedneRs on eaeh shipment. But
that ciremns1ance would not prevent an aceord and Ratisfaction ariRing- from aeceptanre of thP conditionally offered remittances applicable to the entire demand. While there is
some conflict in the authorities on whether the payment of the
conceded part- of the claim is a good accord and satisfaction
if received in diseharge of the whole ( anno. 112 A.L.R. 1219),
it is the majority view, as well as the "tendency of the later
easeR," to "sustain the discharge where there is a dispute aR
to any part of the elaim madP by the creditor. although thP
payment is only the sma11Pr amount which was conceded by
the debtor to be due." (1 Am .•Tur. § 64, p. 251; also Williston
on Contracts, rev. ed., vol. I, § 129, p. 439, and cases there
cited.) Consistent with this "tendency" in the rationale of
"the later cases" is the derision in Robertson v. Robertson.
supra. 84 Cal.App.2d 118, whPrP concf'dedly dne payments of
snpport mone;\' were made by check" marked ~'in full pay~
ment to rdate l" and the only fliRpnte between the part.iPS
inYolYe(l the qnrr;tion of wh<'thrr a greater ammmt waR due
pursuant to the tPrms of a property sPttlement agreement. Tn
sm;taining tlw defense of an aceord and satisfaction, the court
aptly stated at page 118: "The consideration for the tE'nder
and aeeeptance of each check in a less amount was the determination of dispute, and the extinction of obligation in relation to Pach monthly payment so made."
[12] "The law wisely favors settlements, and where there is a
real :mel gennine rontE'st betwE'E'n the parties, and a settlement
is had without fraud or misrepresentation, for an amount
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determined upon as a
between the conflicting
claims, such settlement should be
although such amount
is materially less than the amount
by the person to
v. TJwmas, 212 N.Y. 264 [106 N.E.
whom it is paid."
B. & lV. Engi;neering Oo. v. Beam, supra,
It is
to see
how defend"'""t'u"·'" in stating to plainthe conditional tender of the
or drafts in question,
and we therefore conclude that the latter's acceptance and
""'""',lj'l': of
and
pursuant to their unequivocal terms of "full settlement" constituted, as a matter of
Jaw, an accord and satisfaction.
The judgment is reversed, with directions to the trial court
to make findings of fact· and conclusions
law and to enter
judgment thereon iu
of defendants in
with
the
net:tH1lL

Shenk, J., Edmonds,
concurred.

and Schaner, J .,

CARTER, J.-I disseut.
While the factual situation disclosed by the record may have
presented a. problem
of solution by the trier of fact,
I cannot say that there was not sufficient evidence to support
the findiug that defendant corporation was indebteded to the
plaintiff in the amount found, and for which judgment was
rendered. This
was affirmed by the District Court
of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, and I
adopt, as my dissent, the opinion of that court prepared by
1\fr, Presiding J ustiee White, which is as follows:
''Defendants appeal from a judgment in :favor of plaintiff,
a lumber broker, in an action fO'r a balance claimed to be due
under contracts :for the sale of three carloads of lumber to
the de:feudant corporation, Pacific Coast Lumber Company.
Defendants C. V. Wilson and S. G. Truitt, as vice-president
and purchasing
respectively, of defendant corporatiou,
negotiated the contracts. The complaint was in thf;l form of
common counts. The answer, in addition to denials, set forth
an affirmative defense of a'Ccord and satisfaction, the substance of the allegations in this respect being that three cheeks
in stated amounts had been mailed to plaintiff by defendant
corporation; that attached to each of said cheeks was a voucher
in which said defendant informed plaintiff that it intended
the check as full payment of a certain disputed claim; that

PoTTER

so attached to the three
that the
intended as full no,rrrlOYI
tiff indorsed and cashed each
and
the settlement intended by the defendant
uutn.tug said
the defendants in
transaction involved a carload
per
surfacing, and
' with 2 per cent discount for
lumber \Yas to be shipped from Oregon to San Luis
arrival of the shipment, defendant corporation
freight bill ·which covered freight from
to San Luis Obispo. The corporation then remitted $2,930.14 by check to the plaintiff, this sum representing the amount of the plaintiff's invoice less the cash
'discount and less $86.40 claimed as 'freight
the difference between the freight actually paid the
carrier and the freight from Portland, Oregon.
''Subsequently defendant corporation ordered two more
carloads of pine, one to be shipped to Grover City, California,
and the other to Santa Barbara. Again, it was understood
that the lumber was to come from Oregon, although the plaintiff testified that he informed defendants it would come from
eastern Oregon. The lumber in these two carloads was roughmilled at Seneca, in eastern Oregon. One carload was then
shipped to Brewster, Oregon, for 're-manufacture,' and from
there transported to Grover City, while the other carload was
shipped to Portland for 're-manufacture' and thence to Santa
Barbara. On each of these shipments defendant corporation
remitted to the plaintiff by check, deducting the 2 per cent
cash discount and also deducting the items representing
freight charges from eastern to western Oregon. In the case
of the Santa Barbara car defendant also made certain deductions for 'scant loading,' 'improper surfacing,' and 'random
widths.'
"Defendant C. V. Wilson testified that by F.O.B. mill'
he understood to mean F.O.B. the 're-manufacturing' mill
where the lumber was finished and from whence it was finally
shipped; he and other witnesses also testified to a custom of
the lumber trade that where Oregon lumber is sold 'F.O.B.
mill' a zone freight rate is often specified, but if nothing is
said about the zone, then the 'Portland rate,' from Portland,
Oregon, to destination, will apply; in such case the custom
is for the purchaser to charge back to the seller any excess
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In none of the transactions here
said
or the
rate
the bare
'F.O.B. mill.'
Plaintiff denied the existence of any such custom.
for each of the three
defendant
attached
for which
amount of the
Printed at the
each such voucher was the notation :
will please detach and keep this statement.
ment of
draft attached hereto is accepted in full settlement of account stated below, and endorsement thereof will
~~onstitute payee's receipt to the Pacific Coast Immber Company of California.'
''The trial court found that defendants were indebted to
in the sum of $1,011.96; and with respect to the
special defense found that the allegations thereof (except, of
course, that the checks were actually sent) were untrue, thereby
finding that it was not true that by the voucher attached to
0ach check defendant corporation 'informed plaintiff that it
intended the check as full payment of a certain disputed
daim,' or that the vouchers 'informed plaintiff that the said
checks were intended as full payment.' The court further
found that 'it is not true that plaintiff, by the acceptance,
endorsement and/or depositing for collection of said drafts,
or in any other manner, agreed to any settlement of the amount
rlne plaintiff.'
"Appellants contend that the trial court's findings relating
to the alleged accord and satisfaction were contrary to undisputed facts in evidence. With respect to the finding (implied)
that plaintiff was not informed that the checks he received
were intenderl by defendant corporation as payment in full.
attention iR dir(wted to testimony of the plaintiff. aR follows:
" 'Q. Dirl you talk to him (Mr. Wilson) before yon cashed
it. Did yon eall him up before you cashed it 1 (Referring
to the payment on the first shipment.) A. Yes, I think I did;
and then I felt, if they were going to be that way about it,
the best thing for me to do was to cash the draft RO they
(•ouldn 't stop payment on the draft. This was not a check.
it was a drafi. I knew that, with a dispute of that type, that
there would be a fJuestion as to my accE'pting that as final
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payment, but I figured that a bird in the hand was better
than nothing.

" 'Q. \V ell, Mr. Potter, at the time you eashed those checks,
you knew there was a dispute as to the amounts? A. Yes,
because the amount was short on the draft. I :figured we >vould
be able to settle it one way or the other later.
" 'Q. Did you know the basis for the dispute A. No, only
from cheeking the dedmtions that I :figured that they took.
I knew that the freight amounted to so much. Q. Then you
surmised, at least, that the deduction on one item was for
freight? A. That's right. Q. And on the other item, yon
had notice of what the decluctions were from the attached
statement with the ch0ck, did you noU A. Yes, sir.'
"Appellants argue that 'on thE' basis of the foregoing testimony the ultimate fact irresistibly following is that the defendant corporation informed the plaintiff . . . that the check or
draft tendered therewith was offered in full payment of a
ecrtain fully idrnti:fi0d. (1ispntrd claim.' Appellants' remaining two contentions with respect to the findings are that there
is no support in the evidence for the finding that by his acceptance of the checks or drafts plaintiff did not agree to
a settlement, or for the finding that there was no bona :fide
dispute eonrerning the amount due.
''As conceded by appellants, 'A :finding of the trial court
upon conflicting evidenre will not be disturbed on appeal if
there is evidence of a substantial character which reasonably
supports tl1e judgment.' (F'ewel ([; Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt. 17
Ca1.2d 85, 88 [108 P.2d 650].) It is also well settled that the
conelnsions of a trier of fact from evidence or testimony that
is susceptible of conflicting or opposing inferences will not be
set aside by an appellate tribunal. ( n'state of Br~:stol, 2::1 Cal.
2d 221 [14::1 P.2d 689] .)
"Conreding the foree of appellants' argument that the evidrlH'r cl(•arly shows the existencP of a dispute as to the amount
(111(', and fnrtl1er that plaintiff was informed, by the fact that
thP eheeks WNe for less than the amount of his invoice, by
the notations appearing on the attached vouchers, and through
telephone conversations with defendants, that defendant corporation contested the particular freight items in questionit does not follow that the trial court erred, as a matter of law,
in concluding that no accord and satisfaction was consummated.
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"It was an essential clement of defendants' proof of an
accord and satisfaction that their tender of a check for less
than the amount due be expressly conditioned that if the money
be accepted, it is to be iu full satisfaction. (1 Am.Jur. 222,
223.) As said in the cited authority, at page 223 :
'· 'As pointed out in the preceding section, in order that
the aeceptanee of an offer of payment of a lesser sum in diseharge of a greater shall result in the discharge, it is a necessary element that the offer be made upon condition that the
creditor accept the offered sum in full satisfaction of the indebtedness. 'rhis principle finds frequent application in the
case of checks and other remittances. In order that the acceptance of the check or remittance shall operate as a full discharge, the eondition that it is to be accepted in full satisfaction of the pending claim or obligation must be expressly
made or the circumstances must be such as to indicate clearly
to the creditor that it is so sent.
" 'When the assent of the creditor is sought to be inferred
from the acceptance of a less sum than that claimed to be due,
the fact that such amount is offered in full discharge of the
whole claim must have been communicated to the creditor
in some unmistakable manner. Consequently, where a check
is tendered, even though it accompanies an account, if there
is no expression of the condition that it must be accepted in
full payment, the acceptance of the check does not constitute
an accord and satisfaction, as no agreement to that effect can
be implied from the transaction . . . . '
''Under the particular facts of the case at bar, it would
appear that the trier of faet was justified in concluding, despite the printed statement on the voucher, that the tender
of eaeh check or draft was not unequivocally stated to be on
condition that it be accepted in full settlement. The language
of Owens v. Noble, 77 Cal.App.2d 209, 215 f175 P.2d 241],
quoting from Biaggi v. Sawyer, 75 Cal.App.2d 105, 114 [170
P.2d 6781, is here pertinent: ' "Whether there was a dispute
concerning the amount due and whether the tender was on
condition that acceptance would be in full satisfaction, are
primarily questions of fact for the trial court.'' In the case
of W at·k v. Associated Almond Growers, 102 Cal.App. 232,
2:36 [282 P. 9651, this court quoted from cited authorities as
follows : "It is an essential element of accord and satisfaction
by tender of a cheek, that the tender is subject to the condition
that the acceptance of the check is satisfaction in full. This
condition is uot shown by the mere fact that the debtor ac-
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''The record does not disclose conclusive evidence that
was
advised that his
of the
drafts in any of the three transactions would be
eonsidered as an agreement to an accord and satisfaction.
On the contrary, the actions of the parties indicate
that the defendant corporation asserted that it was not liable
for eertaiu freight charges and refused to pay them. It is
significant in this respect that the disputed freight
>Yas a separable item. The amount tendered by defendant corporation was an amount admittedly due. The trier of fact
eonld ·well conclude that the amount tendered was not offered
in settlement of a disputed claim, but, as above stated, in payment of a conceded indebtedness, leaving at large the question
of from whieh point freight should be charged to the buyer.
Upon analysis, the facts herein show that an acknowledged
debtor has made a remittance of an amount admittedly clue,
and now seeks to have declared an accord and satisfaction
beeause the ereditor accepted what was concededly justly due
him. rl'he trier of fact was \Varranted in concluding that there
was Jacking an essential element of an accord and satisfaction,
to wit, that the payment was offered and accepted in settlement
of a disputed demand. Here no payment whatever was made
on the 'disputed' demand.
"The situation here presented is one in which an aclmowledged debtor, disputing one small separable item of an invoice received in the regular course of business, deducts from
his remittance the amount he disputes and remits in the regular eourse of business an amount admittedly
accompanying his check with a voucher in enstomary form containing printed ~words to the effect that the remittance is accepted
'in full settlement of account stated below.' It cannot be
held that as a matter of law in such circumstances there has
been an aceorcl and satisfaction or account stated.
'' '. . . to hold otherwise would put in the power of a
sharp, shre>vd business man frequently to take advantage of

ecmsiileration.
''The
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defendants'
is affirmed. ''
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